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FuTURB lNTERESTs-CoMMoN LAw RuLE AGAINST PERPBTUITIBS NoT IN
FoRCB IN IDAHO-APPLICABILITY OF STATUTE AGAINST SusPBNSION oF PoWBR oF
ALIENATION TO OPTION CoNTRACT-Seller contracted to give purchaser sixty days
notice of his intention to sell certain real property, purchaser to have power, in
that event, to buy the property for a stated price within the sixty days. If the purchaser failed to exercise the option, seller was then free to convey the property to
anyone. Alleging that seller had conveyed the land to others without notice to
him, purchaser sued to have this conveyance set aside and the option specifically
enforced. The lower court sustained a general demurrer to the complaint. On
appeal, held, reversed. The statutory rule against restraints on alienation1 has replaced the common law rule against perpetuities in Idaho. The option contract
in this case does not violate the statutory rule. Locklear v. Tucker, (Idaho 1949)

203 P. (2d) 380.
Since Idaho adopted its statutory rule against restraints on alienation from
California,2 it is not surprising that both court and counsel in the principal case
look to California law for an indication whether the statutory rule eliminates the
common law rule against perpetuities. Although there was early dicta by the California courts that the common law rule was displaced by the statutes,3 recent intermediate appellate court decisions hold that the common law rule is in force
in California.4 The court in the principal case relies heavily upon the early California dicta, apparently unaware of the later decisions. The holding in the principal case that the statutory rule supplants the common law rule against perpetuities is, nevertheless, in accord with the overwhelming weight of authority. 5
Where the rule against perpetuities is in force, an option to purchase land must
conform to the allowable period of the rule. 6 Because the purchaser and seller of
l Idaho Code (1948) §55-111. This provision was adopted in 1887 from California,
which had borrowed it from New York in 1872. See 4 PnoPERTY RESTATEMENT, Appx., c. B,
,r39 (1944).
2 Ibid. The California statute remains substantially the same, though the allowable
period was changed in 1917. See Cal. Civil Code (Deering, 1941) §715.
3 Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 187 P. 159 (1919); Blakeman v. Miller, 136 Cal.
138, 68 P. 587 (1902); cases cited in Re Sahlender's Estate, (Cal. App. 1948) 201 P. (2d)
69 at 75.
4 Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 541, 114 P. (2d) 646 (1941); In re Sahlender's
Estate, (Cal. ApP. 1948) 201 P. (2d) 69, 47 MicH. L.REv. 1020 (1949). The above decisions are grounded in part on the California constitutional proluoition of perpetuities. There
is no such provision in the Idaho constitution. See 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Appx., c. B,
,r39 (1944). Cf. In re Micheletti's Estate, 24 Cal. (2d) 904, 151 P. (2d) 833 (1944),
where the court stated that California law on this point is uncertain.
5 Rodey v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90, 273 N.W. 404 (1937); Buck v. Walker, 115 Minn.
239, 132 N.W. 205 (1911). In both Michigan and Minnesota the common law rule against
perpetuities is applicable to future interests in personalty, since the statutes pertain only to
realty. See Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 at 434 (1888); In re Tower's
Estate, 49 Minn. 371, 52 N.W. 27 (1892). See also 4 PROPllRTY REsTATEMENT, Appx., c.
B, ,r,r3, 39, 50, 59 (1944).
6 2 SrMEs, Fannra l:NTEREsTs §512 (1936); 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§393 et seq.
(1944); GRAY, THE Rau AGAINST PERPETmTIEs, 4th ed., §330 (1942).
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an option can unite and convey an absolute fee, however, these devices have generally been held to be outside the scope of statutory rules against restraints on
alienation. 7 An additional feature of the principal case is the court's failure to distinguish the option here involved (frequently termed a preemptive option), from
ordinary purchase options. A preemptive option differs markedly from ordinary
options8 because it effects a more substantial curtailment of alienability. 9 Such an
option could logically be invalidated, regardless of duration, as a direct restraint
on alienation. 10 Nevertheless, courts have ordinarily classed preemptive options
with ordinary options as indirect restraints on alienation.11

Howard W. Haftel, S.Ed.

7 Buck v. Walker, 115 Minn. 239, 132 N.W. 205 (191 l); Blakeman v. Miller, 136 Cal.
138, 68 P. 587 (1902); Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W, 62 (1926). Cf.
Bay Shore Motors v. Baker, (Cal. App. 1949) 202 P. (2d) 865. See also 2 Sn.ms, FOTm.m
hmraESTS §§564, 565 (1936). Nor have such options been required to comply with the
New York statutory rule against remoteness of vesting. N.Y. Real Property Law (McKinney,
1945) §50. In re City of New York, 246 N.Y. l at 26, 157 N.E. 911 (1927); In re Hauser's
Will, 50 N.Y.S. (2d) 709 (1944).
8 An ordinary option gives the optionee the unqualified privilege to purchase whenever
he chooses for a fixed price or market price. A preemptive option is qualified by the condition
that it may be exercised only if the owner wishes to sell. See 4 PROPERTY REsTATBMEN'l'
§§393f, 413(2) (1944); 2 SrMEs, FUTURE hm!Rl!STS §462 (1936).
•
9 A preemptive option to buy at a fixed price will always deter sale of the land when
that price is below market value. The seller will not wish to sell below market value, and
the purchaser's option is conditioned on seller's wish to sell. See In re Rosher, .26 Ch. D. 801
(1884); 4 PROPEl\Tr RESTATEMENT §413f (1944).
IO 4 PROPERTY" REsTATEMENT §413f, illustr. 2 (1944), seems to take the view that a
preemptive option to purchase for a fixed price (such as that in the principal case) is invalid
as a direct restraint on alienation. See also In re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 801 (1884); 2 SIMEs,
Fannm INrmrasTS §462 (1936); Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141, 15 P. 451 (1887).
11 Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926); Maddox v. Keeler, 296
Ky. 440, 177 S.W. (2d) 568 (1944); Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright, 11 Ch. D. 421
(1879).

